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Abstract 
 
A trend in contemporary discussion pertaining to the imagination has 
attempted to theoretically conceptualise a type of qualia-free imagination, 
commonly referred to as propositional imagination. This paper argues that an 
act of imagination cannot be an act of imagination without both cognitive and 
sensory phenomenology. Both sensory and cognitive phenomenology play an 
important role in “fixing” the content of imaginative thoughts. Sensory 
phenomenology is what distinguishes imagination as an act of imagination; it 
is what sets imagination apart from other attitudinal mental states, such as the 
attitudinal mental state of supposing. Cognitive phenomenology is both 
proprietary and individuative to conscious thoughts, including imaginings. 
Each imagining takes as part of its content a distinctive kind of cognitive 
phenomenology which allows us to identify, differentiate and understand the 
particular content of a given imagining. I conclude that a type of qualia-free 
imagination is not, in fact, conceivable – theoretically or otherwise. 
Propositional imagination has phenomenology. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Imagine that Pokémon invade planet Earth…” 
 
There is a popular trend (particularly among physicalists and 
functionalists) in contemporary imagination discussions to theoretically 
conceive of the imagination as a phenomenology-free type of mental state. 
For this reason, one should be able to imaginatively understand and entertain 
propositions such as the one above without any associative imagistic, sensory 
or cognitive phenomenology whatsoever. When you imagine that Pokémon 
invade planet Earth you are to imagine this state of affairs without any 
associative imagery at all. This type of qualia-free imagination is commonly 
known in philosophical literature as Attitudinal Imagination or Propositional 
Imagination.  
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Contrary to this influential view, this paper argues that an act of 
imagination cannot be an act of imagination without some kind of imagery, 
sensory “feeling”, experiential element, or simply –  associative 
phenomenology. Imagination must have both sensory phenomenology and 
cognitive phenomenology in order for it to be the type of attitudinal mental 
state it is. This paper further argues that both sensory and cognitive 
phenomenology play an important role in fixing the content of what is being 
imagined. The role of sensory phenomenology not only makes an imagining 
an act of imagination as opposed to any other type of attitudinal mental state, 
such as supposition, but it also does some work in fixing the content of what is 
being imagined. But because we can imagine different propositional content 
with the same imagery, and different imagery with the same propositional 
content, the extent to which sensory phenomenology can fix the content of an 
imagining is limited and thus, on its own, it is not enough to fix the content of a 
given imagining. Cognitive phenomenology is also needed, and it does the 
work in fixing content that sensory phenomenology cannot.  
 
The first half of this thesis focuses on the role of sensory 
phenomenology in propositional imagination, before moving onto the role that 
cognitive phenomenology plays in propositional imagination. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, phenomenology has traditionally been considered to 
be sensory phenomenology only. What follows from this is that so-called 
phenomenology-free attitudinal mental states, have been conceived with the 
view that the only kind of qualia that needs to be extracted from our 
understanding of attitudinal mental states, is sensory phenomenology. For this 
reason, I focus on building a counterargument that directly tackles this 
particular physicalist conception, before including an argument that supports 
the need for additional qualia – cognitive phenomenology. The second reason 
is to avoid any confusion between the role of cognitive and sensory 
phenomenology in imaginative thoughts.  
 
The particular role that cognitive phenomenology plays in conscious 
thoughts is this; it allows us to identify, differentiate and understand the 
particular content of a given conscious thought, including imaginings. 
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Accordingly, cognitive phenomenology is both individuative and proprietary to 
states of imagination. To say that cognitive phenomenology is proprietary is to 
say that each and every conscious thought is accompanied and marked by a 
distinct cognitive phenomenology. To say that cognitive phenomenology is 
individuative is to say that the distinctiveness of the proprietary cognitive 
phenomenology that is present in every conscious thought allows us to 
distinguish and identify – individuate -  the thought as the thought it is – 
different from all other thoughts. Thereby the distinct cognitive 
phenomenology that is both proprietary and individuative to conscious 
thoughts provides conscious thoughts, including imaginings, with the 
particularity that each thought has.  
 
There are some philosophers, such as David Pitt (2004), who uphold a 
position that cognitive phenomenology is constitutive of conscious thoughts. 
This is to make a claim that all there is to conscious thoughts is 
phenomenology. I do not defend the claim that phenomenology is all there is 
to the content of an imagining. Rather, I take the view that there is clearly 
more involved in what fixes the content of imagination than just 
phenomenology. The full extent of what properties are essential to constitute 
an imagining is beyond the scope of this paper. My aim here is to 
demonstrate that whatever else imaginings may be made up of, 
phenomenology, both sensory and cognitive, plays an essential role in fixing 
the content of imaginings, and thus an explanatory account of what the 
imagination is, and what it does, is incomplete without phenomenology. 
 
The layout of this paper is as follows. 
 
Section one gets a grip on what propositional imagination is and how it 
is being used. Attitudinal and phenomenal mental states are outlined in 
greater detail, demonstrating the extent to which some philosophers 
(particularly physicalists and functionalists), are invested in a propositional 
qualia-free type of imagination. For this reason, section one includes a brief 
overview of the architectural model of the imagination. This overview explains 
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how, without phenomenology, functionalists think the content of propositional 
imagination and other attitudinal mental states is fixed. 
 
Section two makes a case for introspection being the process which 
allows us to not only be aware that we are imagining but also what we are 
imagining. Introspection enables us to access the qualia that fix the content of 
our conscious thoughts. When we introspect our conscious thoughts, we can 
understand the content of our thoughts and imaginings. Since we can think 
and imagine in this way, this provides evidence for phenomenology, both 
sensory and cognitive phenomenology.  
 
Section three sets about undermining the main functionalist justification 
for removing all phenomenology from propositional imagination: that 
imagination is theoretically conceivable without phenomenology. I argue here 
that imagination, propositional or otherwise, is in fact not theoretically 
conceivable without imagery. An act of imagination is simply not an act of 
imagination unless it has imagery of some kind.1   
 
Section four outlines the main difference between supposition and 
imagination. It argues that sensory phenomenology is what distinguishes 
supposition from imagination. Sensory phenomenology fixes imagination as 
the type of attitudinal mental state it is – in a way that it does not fix the 
attitudinal mental state of supposition. I conclude that imagination of all types 
must have imagery in order to make it the type of mental state it is. Sensory 
phenomenology cannot therefore be extracted, “theoretically” or otherwise, 
from propositional imagination.   
 
                                                
1 There are some philosophers, such as Nichols and Stitch who clearly think that 
phenomenology can be separated from the propositional content of attitudinal mental states – 
attitudinal mental states that include imagination. I argue that phenomenology cannot be 
separated from propositional imagination. This includes the actual separation of 
phenomenology, and Nichols’ theoretic separation of phenomenology or imagery from 
propositional imagination. Where Nichols thinks that it is theoretically possible to remove 
qualia from propositional imagination, I think it is not theoretically possible to remove qualia 
from imagination. For this reason, I use the term “theoretically conceivable” with a view that 
the possibility of such an action is saturated with scare quotes and doubt. 
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Section five sketches out the way in which we ordinarily experience 
imagery when we undertake an extended episode of imagination. It proposes 
that although imagery is an essential property of imagination, it does not 
appear to fix the content of each and every imagining because not each and 
every independently imagined state of affairs is necessarily accompanied with 
clear and distinct imagery.  
 
Section six argues that although imagery cannot be doing all the work 
in fixing the content of what is imagined (as outlined in section five), imagery 
must at least be doing some of the work in fixing the content of what is 
imagined. This is due to the relationship that imagery has with the 
propositional content of a given imagining.  
 
Section seven argues that not only can we apply introspection to 
determine that our conscious thoughts have sensory phenomenology, but we 
can also apply introspection to determine that they also have cognitive 
phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology has a very particular role to play 
in fixing the content of conscious thoughts, including imaginings. Where 
sensory phenomenology does some of the work, but not all of the work, in 
fixing the content of an imagining, cognitive phenomenology does the rest of 
the work in fixing the content of imaginings. It picks up some of the slack. 
Cognitive phenomenology therefore also does some work in fixing the content 
of a given imagining.  
 
The paper concludes that an act of imagination cannot be an act of 
imagination without both cognitive and sensory phenomenology and that both 
types of phenomenology have an essential role to play in fixing the content of 
imaginings. By demonstrating that propositional imagination has 
phenomenology, and, moreover that the phenomenology does some work in 
fixing the content of propositional imagination, the SI/PI distinction so widely 
used by contemporary philosophers collapses and the conception of a type of 
qualia-free imagination is brought into serious question. This creates an 
ongoing problem for functionalists, physicalist and those who support the 
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notion that imagination – propositional or otherwise -  can be theoretically 
conceptualized without phenomenology. 
 
For the sake of brevity, the rest of this paper abbreviates propositional 
imagination to PI; sensory imagination to SI; cognitive phenomenology to CP; 
and sensory phenomenology to SP. Please also bear in mind that imagery is 
meant to include visual, auditory, olfactory, and other sensory experiential 
elements; in short, imagery is sensory phenomenology. Qualia is a term 
meant for plural sensory data. The terms ‘qualia’ and ‘phenomenology’ are 
often indiscriminately interchanged throughout this document. 
 
 
Section One - Propositional Imagination 
Propositional Imagination 
The PI conception has its roots in the representational theory of mind. 
This theory postulates that all of our mental states can fit into two categories: 
mental states that are attitudinal in kind and mental states that are 
phenomenological in kind. Attitudinal mental states take propositions as their 
content and are without phenomenology. Belief, desire, hope and hate, are all 
thought to be paradigm examples of attitudinal mental states. Phenomenal 
mental states, on the other hand, are conceived as not taking propositions as 
their content. They are phenomenological in kind. Having a headache, seeing 
a colour, feeling a pleasurable sensation, are all thought to be paradigm 
examples of phenomenal mental states. Philosophers have had a difficult time 
placing imagination in either mental state category because imagination, by its 
very nature, appears to be able to take both propositions and imagery as its 
content.  
 
In order to deal with this problem, the imagination has been given 
some exceptional treatment - treatment that no other mental state has 
endured: imagination has been theoretically separated into two different types 
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of mental state. One is attitudinal in kind and takes propositions as its content, 
and the other is phenomenological in kind and takes phenomenology as its 
content. The first is known as propositional imagination and is often identified 
with imagine-that cases. The second is known as sensory imagination and is 
often identified with imagine cases.  
 
There are two main approaches to this separation. There are those 
who think that attitudinal mental states can have phenomenology, but accept 
that phenomenology is inessential to attitudinal mental states, and therefore 
attitudinal mental states can theoretically be conceptualized without 
phenomenology. Then there are those (physicalists) who think that mental 
states simply do not have phenomenology. In fact, physicalists outright deny 
the existence of phenomenology altogether, because phenomenology is not a 
physically reducible property. On a physicalist view, everything can be 
explained by a causal story with concrete inputs and outputs, and there is 
nothing more to it.  
 
Aside from clear instances where the distinction has been used in 
debate, a comprehensive description of PI does not appear to exist anywhere 
in the philosophical literature. So, in order to get a firmer handle on what we 
are talking about, here are a range of examples from recent texts where the 
PI/SI distinction is outlined:   
 
Acts of imagination that take the form of imagining-that are what 
philosophers typically call propositional or attitudinal imagining, and this 
is typically contrasted with sensory or imagistic imagination (Kind, 
2016, pg.5). 
 
Having mental imagery of an apple should be differentiated from 
imagining that there is an apple in the kitchen, an imagining episode, 
which amounts to having a propositional attitude. The sense of 
imagination where there are interesting questions about the relation 
between perception and imagination is not propositional imagination, 
but mental imagery (Nanay, 2016, pg.124). 
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Philosophers who think about imagination often distinguish between 
propositional imagination on the one hand, and experiential, or 
“sensory,” imagination on the other… “propositional imaginings” and 
“factual memories” are those cases of imagination and memory which 
do not have any experiential characteristics… both in the case of 
imagination and in the case of memory, we can distinguish between a 
propositional kind on the one hand, and an experiential kind on the 
other (Debus, 2016, pg.135-136). 
 
Throughout, I’ll focus on propositional imagination, in which we imagine 
that some state of affairs obtains – for example, imagining that lava is 
flowing, as opposed to imagining lava. This may be the kind of 
imagination for which unified approaches are the most promising, since 
belief is a propositional attitude – one can believe that lava is flowing, 
but it doesn’t make sense to talk about believing lava (Sinhababu, 
2016, pg.111). 
 
[C]ontemporary cognitive accounts of the imagination tend not to treat 
the imagination as imagistic. And indeed, on Yablo’s notion 
imagination, sensory-like images are not required (Nichols, 2006, 
pg.2). 
 
By doing some detective work with these segments as evidence, we 
can deduce a few things about PI. As reported by Kind, Nanay and Debus 
(2016), PI is often strongly distinguished from SI. Therefore, we can infer that 
there is a clear contrast between the two kinds of mental states, where 
everything that is true of PI is not true of SI, and everything that is true of SI is 
not true of PI. Thus, if PI is an attitudinal mental state, then SI is not an 
attitudinal mental state; if PI takes propositions as its content then SI does not 
take propositions as its content; if SI has imagistic and therefore 
phenomenological content, then PI does not have imagistic or 
phenomenological content. In sum then, PI is an attitudinal mental state that 
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takes propositions as its content, and does not have imagery or 
phenomenological content.  
 
In fact, physicalist/functionalists such as Nichols (2006) even go so far 
as to claim that a full account of imagination can be gleaned from PI alone 
and there is no need to invoke any other type of imagination such as SI. On 
Nichols’ terms, imagination is an attitudinal mental state that takes 
propositions as its content; “images are not required,” in any account of the 
imagination and that’s all there is to it. For Nichols, the content of an 
imagining is, and is only, propositional content. As such, Nichols & Stitch 
(2000) and Nichols (2006) have developed an account for a propositional, 
qualia-free imagination. The functionalist account for PI provides a causal 
story which describes how PI works and interacts with other attitudinal mental 
states such as belief. Through describing how imagination treats its 
propositional qualia-free content, this account is designed to provide a 
coherent explanation of not only how an imagining is an imagining, but also, 
how it differs from other attitudinal mental states.  
 
True to functionalism, everything on their model is functionalisable. 
Because qualia are non-physical and so cannot be functionalized, they have 
been deliberately left out of their model. For physicalists and functionalists 
alike, imagination must be explained without phenomenology, and in a purely 
physical way. If the physicalist position is undermined if they fail to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of what the imagination is and how it works 
without qualia. Thus, there is a lot riding on the physicalist move to extract the 
qualia from imagination and a potentially big problem is created for 
physicalists if it can be demonstrated that without phenomenology, their 
causal story falls short of a full explanation of imagination. 
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The Functionalist Architecture of the Imagination 
 The functionalist architecture of the imagination relies on 
Representationalist theories of the mind (Nichols, 2006, pg.6). 
Representationalism theorises that propositions are mentally represented by 
something referred to as representational tokens. These “tokens” 
representationally express the propositions which specify the world as being a 
certain way. Representational tokens often take the form of expressing 
propositions by mentalese2 that-sentences (that such-and-and such is the 
case). All aspects of the functionalist architecture of the mind can be 
functionalized, and in what follows I briefly explain how.  
 
Attitudinal mental states such as belief, intent, like, and so on all take 
propositions as their content; they are attitudes to propositions. It is easy to 
think of an attitudinal mental state and a propositional content as being 
analogous to a container and its contents where the attitudinal mental state is 
the container and the proposition is the content. The containers are able to do 
different things with the contents, and the nature of the containers are 
determined by their ability to do these different things. In a similar way to a 
container and content, if an attitudinal mental state does not have a 
proposition to direct itself toward, the attitudinal mental state is not doing 
anything. It has to have propositional content in order for it to work and it 
makes no sense to have one without the other. And, just as different contents 
can be placed into the same container, and different containers can have the 
same content, we can have the same mental attitude to different contents, 
and different mental attitudes towards the same content. When we apply 
different attitudinal mental states to the same proposition, we believe that p, 
hope that p, or desire that p, etc. For example, we: 
§ Believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
§ Hope that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
§ Desire that the sun will rise tomorrow. 
And so on… 
                                                
2 Mentalese sentences are thoughts that are expressed in a language that is unique to our 
thoughts. These thoughts can be represented as concepts, ideas, words or sentences.  
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We can also change the attitude. We can: 
§ Believe that Donald Trump is the 45th President. 
§ Believe that Donald Trump is a disastrous choice of President. 
§ Believe that Barack Obama was a much better President. 
And so on…  
Functionalists claim that the essence of attitudinal mental states is the 
role they play; the cause and effect of a given mental state determines what 
the mental state is. Moreover, they claim, everything can be explained by the 
causes and effects of a given mental state. No experiential character, ‘what it 
is likeness’ or phenomenology plays any role or needs to be accounted for. 
Everything can be explained in a physical way. Here is a rough illustration that 
offers short-hand versions of the unique profile of cause and effect that, 
according to functionalism, might individuate each type of mental state:  
 
Propositional Attitude Proposition Output/Action 
Jo believes  That Pokémon invade 
planet Earth 
Jo searches for them 
Jo hopes That Pokémon invade 
planet Earth 
Jo prays for it to 
happen 
Jo expects That Pokémon invade 
planet Earth 
Jo prepares for their 
arrival 
Jo fears That Pokémon invade 
planet Earth 
Jo hides from them 
Jo imagines That Pokémon invade 
planet Earth 
Jo instigates a game of 
pretence 
 
 
Where the output can be identified as the effect of a given attitudinal 
mental state, the content of the attitudinal mental state consists in one’s 
disposition to do these things. In addition, functionalism also defines a mental 
state by its causal relations to other mental states. The causal relations that a 
given mental state has towards propositional content, and other mental states 
defines it as the mental state it is. Jo’s fear that Pokémon invade planet Earth, 
 14 
is different from Jo’s fear that she will fail her Masters Philosophy degree, 
because it leads to different effects. In the first case, she might hide away and 
wait until the coast is clear, in the second case she might work harder to 
sharpen the argument of her Masters dissertation.  
 
Cognitive and Conative mental states 
 Attitudinal mental states are thought to differ not just in their operation, 
but in the direction of their operation. They are usually divided up into two 
separate classifications: conative and cognitive. Attitudinal mental states that 
are thought to be cognitive attitudes are those attitudes that have a world-to-
mind direction of fit (Kind, 2016, pg5). They are operating successfully if they 
are accurately representing the way the world is. Belief is thought to be a 
paradigmatic case of a cognitive attitude because it is thought that belief is 
working well for us if it is accurately representing the way in which the world 
actually is. We generally struggle to hold contradictory beliefs about the same 
proposition. For example, we cannot believe that the sun is both hot and not 
hot. And we also find it difficult to hold a belief when faced with evidence that 
the belief is untrue. For instance, we find it difficult to believe that the Earth is 
flat in the face of all the evidence that the Earth is spherical. 
 Mental states such as desire are thought to be conative in nature. 
Conative attitudes have what is called a mind-to-world direction of fit (Kind, 
2016, pg.5). They are operating successfully if they are aimed at how we 
would like the world to be, not how it already is. If the proposition under 
consideration is already the case, it is difficult to desire that it be the case; for 
once the desire is satisfied, it ceases to be a desire. One can desire that a 
state of affairs remain the case, but one cannot desire that something come to 
pass, if it already has come to pass. For this reason, conative attitudinal 
mental states are only thought to work if the world is not already how we 
would like it to be. If we were to hope or desire something that is already true 
of the world, in a similar way to belief, our attitudes would not be behaving in 
the way we think they should (Kind, 2016, pg.5). 
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 The attitudinal mental state of PI is thought to be a cognitive mental 
state as opposed to a conative mental state. This is because PI is thought to 
not only resemble belief in certain respects, but like belief, it has a mind-to-
world direction of fit. The difference is that in the case of belief, the world that 
the attitudinal mental state is directed towards is the actual world, whereas in 
the case of PI the world that the attitudinal mental state is being directed 
towards is a possible world. For this reason, the idea of a Possible Worlds 
Box is central to the functionalist’s architecture of the imagination.  
 
The Possible Worlds Box (PWB) 
PWB is where PI is able to consider a rich array of counterfactual 
claims based upon what we believe to be true about the actual world. The 
way in which the PWB operates is as follows: an initial representational token 
that expresses a proposition is placed inside the PWB. The token need not be 
an expression of a proposition that describes the way in which the world 
actually is, but it can be. For instance, we can start with propositions such as 
that President Trump has two terms in office or propositions such as that 
purple crabs invade from Mars. The first proposition can be true of the real 
world or a possible world because it is relevant to the real world, and can be 
made to be relevant to a possible world. Whereas the second proposition can 
only be true of a possible world, for it is clearly not true of the actual world.  
 
Once inside the PWB, the way in which we treat the proposition under 
consideration is similar to the way in which we would treat the proposition if 
we were to apply the attitudinal mental state of belief towards it. According to 
Nichols (2006, pg.461), the representations in both the PWB and the belief 
box are coded similarly; they are in the effective ‘same code’. The details of 
this code are unknown. All that is suggested is that whatever the code may 
be, the representations in the belief box and PWB are the same, or at the 
least, very similar and that the representations take the same logical form as 
one another (Nichols & Stitch, 2000, pg.126). This similarity is thought to allow 
them both to produce affective responses that are very much alike. They 
write: 
 16 
 
[F]or any mechanism that takes input from both the pretense box 
[PWB] and the belief box, the pretense representation p will be 
processed much the same way as the belief representation p… On the 
single code hypothesis, then, if a mechanism takes pretense 
representations as input, that mechanism will process the pretense 
representation much the same way it would process an isomorphic 
belief (2006, pg.461-2). 
 
Not only do Nichols & Stitch propose that representations within the 
PWB and the belief box are similarly coded, but it is also thought that the 
attitudinal mental states of PI and belief process representations in a similar 
way (Nichols, 2000, pg.126). They do this via inferential elaboration (both 
deductive and non-deductive) and grounding in real world beliefs.  
 
In order to ground imaginative episodes in our real-world beliefs, 
Nichols & Stitch (1999), argue that what happens to the initial proposition is 
that our cognitive system starts to fill the PWB with a detailed description of 
what the possible world would be like, if it were the case that the initial 
proposition was true. In order to do this, all of the propositions that we believe 
to be true of the actual world are also active within the PWB (or at least 
clusters of beliefs that are relevant to the propositions under consideration 
(Nichols & Stitch, 2000, pg.126)). They ‘assume that in addition to the 
pretence initiating premise, the cognitive system puts the entire contents of 
the Belief Box into the Possible World Box’ (ibid, 2000, pg.123). For this 
reason, the PWB can become filled with a rich array of tokens expressing 
propositional contents, both in terms of the propositions that we imaginatively 
entertain in a Possible World, and the propositions we believe about the 
actual world. 
 
This aligns with a claim first made by Kendal Walton, (1990, pg.21). He 
proposes that our imagination is working well if it is not completely uncoupled 
from the way in which the world is. Imaginings usually take anchorage in the 
real world. When imagining, our touchstone is usually that which we believe to 
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be true of reality. By using what we believe to be the case in the real world, 
we are able to work through various scenarios using logical chains of 
inference. Unless we are expressly told otherwise, or decide otherwise, we 
assume that Trump is a human and lives in the USA, and that he is not one of 
the purple-crab Martians. Moreover, purple crabs invading from Mars should 
not logically follow from Trump having two terms in office. Unless otherwise 
agreed upon, to imagine that strange consequences can follow from the initial 
propositions would be to imagine incorrectly. 
 
PI also relies on the same inference mechanisms used by belief. After 
filling in background knowledge of a given proposition under consideration 
with our real-world beliefs, it then sorts through relevant plausible possibilities 
of what might come next in an imaginative episode. So, one might start by 
imagining that Pokémon invade planet Earth. For the sake of the imagining, 
one would have to accept, when inside the PWB, the proposition as true. 
Given that all of our beliefs about the actual world are also in the PWB along 
with the imagined propositions of that-Pokémon…, what follows next are 
inferential searches to options of what would plausibly follow given the starting 
imagined proposition within the context of all of our real-world beliefs. For 
example, one might imagine that what follows next is that: 
§ There will be widespread excitement or panic. 
§ People will go out Pokémon hunting. 
§ There will be associated news bulletins. 
And so on… 
The similar inferential behaviour of imagination and belief, coupled with the 
need to draw on our beliefs whilst inside the PWB is nicely summarized and 
justified by Currie & Ravenscroft (2002, pg.13): 
It is this capacity of imaginings to mirror the inferential patterns of belief 
that makes fictional storytelling possible. If imaginings were not 
inferentially commensurate with beliefs, we could not draw on our 
beliefs to fill out what the story tells us, and storytellers would have to 
give us all the detail explicitly. 
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As the imagining becomes richer and new propositions are introduced 
that conflict with our actual world beliefs (which are tokened within the PWB), 
our actual world beliefs are updated within the PWB in order to correspond 
with the imagining. This allows us to avoid contradictions and inferential chaos 
within the PWB. This “updating” is the specific job of a sub-component of the 
inference mechanism used in the belief box and PWB. This Sub-component is 
referred to by Nichols & Stitch as the UpDater. When a new premise is added 
to the PWB, it plays the role of a new belief and the UpDater sets about 
removing or changing the real beliefs inside the PWB that are incompatible 
with the new imagined premise (2000, pg.124). This updating allows us to 
believe, for example, that one is not capable of magic, whilst at the same time 
imagining that one is capable of magic (Sinhababu, 2016, pg115).  
 
In summary, this is the functionalist story of how the imagination works 
without imagery or phenomenology: each and every time a new imagining 
takes place, propositional tokens are placed inside the PWB, along with 
tokened beliefs about what we believe to be true of the actual world. As 
imagined propositional contents are inferentially sorted and selected, the 
imagining starts to move away from the actual world and so an UpDater, 
updates the beliefs in the PWB accordingly. An act of imagining is an act of 
imagining simply by the way in which the contents of our tokened propositions 
are mentally processed. There is no need for imagery or phenomenology of 
any kind... Or is there? 
 
 
Section Two – Introspection 
 
Introspection can best be described as our “mind’s eye” or “inward 
looking-glass”. It allows us to access our conscious thoughts, and also to take 
stock of what our conscious thoughts contain. In order for us to have this 
access, introspection provides us with direct acquaintance with the content of 
our conscious thoughts; direct acquaintance that is experienced. We can only 
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have this experiential acquaintance however, if the thought has a distinct 
phenomenal character. Introspection “reads” the phenomenology of conscious 
thoughts and is able to identify the thought as the thought it is by the thought’s 
distinct phenomenology. Without phenomenological content introspection 
cannot work, and furthermore, if introspection cannot work, the thought is not 
an experienced thought – and, by extension, not a conscious thought.  
 
To illustrate this idea: phenomenal mental states such as having a pain 
in the back, or feeling a tingling in the toes are commonly thought of as being 
mental states that are consciously experienced. They are consciously 
experienced because when we introspect we are able to directly acquaint 
ourselves with the distinct phenomenology that comes with the sensation of 
pain or tickling. David Pitt (2004, pg.14) explains that when we apply 
introspection to our conscious thoughts we not only experience them, but we 
are also able to attend to what our thoughts contain. By so doing we not only 
have an awareness that we are consciously experiencing a pain in the back 
rather than a tickling in the toes, but, in addition we are also aware what the 
content of that experience entails – that it is about a pain in the back. 
Introspection then, is the attentive experience of our conscious thoughts. 
 
 Since attitudinal mental states are considered by some, such as 
functionalists and physicalists, to be without phenomenology, they cannot be 
consciously experienced in the same way that phenomenal mental states can 
be experienced. According to this view, there is nothing ‘it is like’ to be in 
them. Pursuing this line of reasoning, what then follows is that since attitudinal 
mental states do not have phenomenology, we cannot introspect them. If we 
cannot introspect them, they are not consciously experienced, and thus, they 
are not conscious thoughts. This reasoning has led to a very odd and 
counterintuitive position where phenomenal mental states are understood to 
be conscious thoughts, but attitudinal mental states are not understood to be 
conscious thoughts.  
 
 Accepting that attitudinal mental states do not have phenomenal 
properties, but that phenomenal mental states do have phenomenal 
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properties splits our thoughts into two categories. By this reckoning, desiring-
that Jo get a fantastic mark on her MA thesis is not a conscious thought, 
whereas feeling hungry is a conscious thought; believing-that Donald Trump 
is a wally is not a conscious thought, whereas having an orgasm is a 
conscious thought, and so on. There are two main ways that this odd 
conclusion can be avoided. Like the physicalists/functionalist, we could deny 
consciousness altogether and claim that no thoughts are conscious thoughts. 
Or, we could accept that attitudinal mental states do indeed have some form 
of phenomenal character, and that we are able to directly acquaint ourselves 
with the experiential nature of these thoughts when we introspectively attend 
to them. 
 
 Those philosophers who do not wish to deny the existence of 
consciousness, but who still wish to maintain the PI/SI distinction have an 
even bigger issue to contend with. If the PI/SI distinction is accepted, then a 
problematic conclusion arises where our imaginings are split into two 
categories. The problem unfolds as follows: if SI is considered to be a 
phenomenal mental state and PI is considered to be an attitudinal mental 
state, it would seem that half of our imaginings are consciously experienced 
imaginings, and half of them are not consciously experienced imaginings. For 
instance, imagining Pokémon invading planet Earth is an imagining with 
phenomenal properties. We can therefore introspect the phenomenal 
properties of the thought and what the thought entails. The thought is 
therefore consciously experienced, and since we can introspect the 
phenomenal properties of sensory imaginings, all sensory imaginings must be 
conscious thoughts. If we accept that imagining-that Pokémon invade planet 
Earth is without phenomenal content, we also have to accept that it has no 
experiential aspect – there is nothing ‘it is like’ to think this thought. If we have 
no conscious experience of this thought, it is because we are unable to 
introspect its content due to its lack of phenomenal properties. Thus, if we are 
unable to introspect the phenomenal properties of this, and all other PIs, PIs 
are not conscious thoughts.  
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How can it possibly be the case that one type of imagining is not 
consciously experienced, but, by merit of the other imagining being seemingly 
richer in SP content it is consciously experienced? It is quite clear that we 
have a conscious experience of both kinds of imaginings. Imagining-that 
Pokémon invade planet Earth, is just as much a conscious thought as 
imagining Pokémon invading planet Earth. It is quite clear that we experience 
imagining-that Pokémon invade planet Earth as a conscious thought, 
because, when we introspect this thought, it provides us with a feeling of what 
it is like to have it. We may not necessarily have a strong experience of its SP 
properties, but, the mental attitude we have towards the content ‘feels’ like an 
imagining. We experience it; it has an experiential quality to it.  
 
If we accept that imagining-that Pokémon invade planet Earth, and 
other PI imaginings have an experiential aspect to them, we are also saying 
that imagining-that Pokémon invade planet Earth, and all other PIs are 
conscious thoughts. And, as David Pitt outlines, to ‘say that a state is 
conscious just is to say there is something it is like to be in it; and it follows 
immediately from the description of a thought as conscious that there is 
something it is like to have it’ (Pitt, 2004, pg.3). Propositional imaginings are 
experienced thoughts because we are able to directly acquaint ourselves with 
the content of the thought when we attentively introspect them. If the content 
of the thought can be experienced, it is because the thought contains 
phenomenal properties. It has qualia. And, just as with phenomenal mental 
states, by virtue of the thought having qualia, the qualia fix the content of the 
thought and allow us to be aware that we are imagining, and be aware of what 
we are imagining.  
 
Section Three - Theoretically Conceivable 
 
Traditionally, SP has been thought to be the only kind of 
phenomenology there is. So, if we can have a mental attitude towards some 
content without entertaining requisite associative imagery, the imagery or SP 
 22 
properties of attitudinal mental states are not considered to be an intrinsic and 
essential property of the mental state. And so, if SP properties are not an 
essential property of attitudinal mental states, we should be able to 
theoretically conceive of attitudinal mental states without SP properties. In 
accordance with the model outlined in section one, we can believe-that 
seventeen is a prime number without having an imagistic experience 
accompanying the belief. We can also desire-that it not rain tomorrow, without 
having an imagistic experience accompanying the desire. 
 
Therefore, if SP is the only type of phenomenology there is, and this 
type of phenomenology appears to be extractable from some attitudinal 
mental states because SP is not an essential property to the content of the 
thought. It then follows that attitudinal mental states are theoretically 
conceivable, and analysable not just without SP content, but without 
phenomenology altogether. This theoretic removal of SP, is one of the main 
justifications for the lack of phenomenology in PI in the functionalist model for 
the imagination. It is also the main justification for the subsequent deployment 
of a qualia-free type imagination in contemporary discussions pertaining to the 
imagination.3 
 
According to functionalists, it would appear that if imagination is an 
attitudinal mental state, we should be able to apply the same theoretical 
extraction of its sensory phenomenology. We should be able to theoretically 
conceive of, and analyse the imagination as being independent from any SP 
content or imagery. However common experience would dictate that when we 
imagine, we do it with imagery. Asking someone to imagine without imagery 
contradicts all of our expectations of what it is to imagine. The word ‘imagine’ 
specifically invites us to be attitudinally disposed towards some state of affairs 
that has imagery. If the state of affairs to which we are attitudinally disposed 
does not have imagery, we are surely not imagining as we ought to. 
Attempting to imagine that a particular state of imagery-free affairs obtains, 
contradicts our natural impulse to imagine with imagery. In fact, some people 
                                                
3 I argue against the view that SP is the only type of phenomenology there is in section 4.  
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might find a request to imagine without some form of imagery, not just 
strange, but simply not achievable. Let us indulge ourselves for a moment, 
and try and do some imagining without imagery.  
 
Imagine-that: 
§ The person sitting next to you has just turned into a zombie. 
 
Now, 
§ Imagine-that London Bridge is made of candy floss. 
 
Try this one, 
§ Imagine-that your mother is a time traveller from the sixth dimension. 
 
How about, 
§ Imagining-that the floor is lava! 
 
Or something a bit more involved, like, 
§ Imagining-that you and I jointly knit a blanket big enough to plug the hole in 
the ozone layer… 
 
How did you get on? Try as I might, I cannot imagine without imagery. When I 
consciously apply the attitude of imagination towards a particular state of 
affairs, such as the ones above, imagery always comes to mind, and I will 
wager that I am not the only one to experience imagining in this way. We 
might claim that imagination appears to be theoretically conceivable without 
its SP properties, but this does not mean to say that we can imagine without 
SP properties. SP properties are an essential feature of what it is to imagine. 
Without this essential feature, an act of imagining is simply not an imagining. 
It is the equivalent of theoretically conceiving of wine without grapes, a river 
without water. Both properties are theoretically removable from wine and 
rivers, but, by doing so, we have extracted properties so intrinsic to the object 
of wine and rivers, that we have completely changed the concept of what wine 
or a river is.  
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Maybe there are those who will claim that they can, in fact, imagine 
some of the examples above without imagery. And, at a push, I might 
concede that I can be attitudinally disposed towards propositional content that 
does not have imagery too. However, in such instances I would also have to 
insist that the attitudinal thought I am having is not an imagining, but some 
other kind of mental attitude - perhaps that of entertaining, considering, 
pondering or supposing – but not imagining. In order for one to imagine, 
imagery has to be present. If imagery is not present a person is simply not 
imagining, but rather engaging in some other attitudinal mental activity. 
 
The reason why we are unable to use our imagination without imagery 
is because imagination is uncannily like our perceptual experiences – but a 
perceptual experience from the ‘inside’. This likeness to our perceptual 
experiences is a compelling reason to think that imagination has to have 
phenomenology in order for it to be an imagining. Amy Kind (2001, pg.94) 
writes that, ‘imagination feels like perception.’ She proposes that imagination 
is a much weaker imitation of our perceptions, but an imitation of our 
perceptions it is nonetheless. And, this resemblance to our perceptions can 
only be rooted in our phenomenological experiences. Thus, imagination must 
have SP. Without SP, we cannot have an inward experience of our perceptual 
experiences, and without this inward experience, it cannot be an imagining. 
 
 Let us be clear, not all uses of the words ‘imagination’, or 
‘imagine’ in common usage are intended to invite a person to engage in an 
activity of imagination. These instances should be considered as 
counterexamples of what it is to imagine a particular state of affairs. Take for 
example, proclamations of surprise such as “imagine that!” or sentiments of 
sympathy such as, “I can’t imagine what it must have been like for you…”, or 
disbelief: “my imagination fails me!” These are instances where the word 
‘imagine’ or ‘imagination’ is being used to express a different meaning, or 
invite a person to engage in a mental state other than the mental state of 
imagination. It is unusual to take these sorts of instructions literally and 
actually try to imagine them, or understand them as an actual imagining. We 
generally tend to understand these sorts of statements as loose uses of 
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colloquial language, rather as we understand phrases such as “this is my view 
of life” as not literally being about a visual experience.  
  
Just as there can be linguistic confusion about what mental state we 
are referring to, sometimes we can misunderstand the attitudinal mental state 
that we are applying to given content. In particular we often confuse the 
mental attitude of supposition with imagination. There are times when we are 
invited to imagine that a particular state of affairs obtains, but, because we are 
unable to imagine that state of affairs (for reasons that will become clearer in 
section four), we end up supposing the state of affairs instead. Supposition 
and imagination share strong similarities in the type of attitudinal mental state 
they are. So it is, at times, easy to become conceptually confused about 
which mental state we are either applying to content, or which mental state we 
are supposed to be applying to content. In fact, imagination and supposition 
are so conceptually alike, that the only way we can functionally distinguish 
them one from the other is by virtue of imagery being an essential property to 
the act of imagination – an essential property that is not attributable to 
supposition. 
 
 
Section Four – Supposing and Imagining 
 
 In On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving 
(2016, pg.42), Magdalena Balcerak Jackson supports the need for a 
‘systematic philosophic taxonomy that describes the difference between 
supposing, conceiving and imagining [and] that explains the epistemological 
consequences of these differences.’ She notes that so far in the literature, a 
comprehensive philosophical taxonomy of these terms does not exist. This 
absence of taxonomy perhaps explains why supposition and imagination can 
so often become conceptually muddled. She also contends that while there 
does appear to be a terminological similarity between them, there is, in fact, a 
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fundamental difference between these cognitive capacities and what they are 
used for.  
 
 In concurrence with Amy Kind and myself, the general distinction 
Jackson sketches for imagination and supposition, in the main, supports a 
concept of the imagination that is, by its intrinsic nature, phenomenological. 
Supposition on the other hand, need not have sensory phenomenology as a 
prerequisite. She writes: 
While imagination involves a phenomenology familiar to us from mental 
states such as perceptual experiences and emotions, supposition 
intuitively does not require such phenomenology (although supposing 
something might initiate a subsequent act of imagining)’ (2016, pg.46).  
 
What follows if we accept this distinction is that supposition has 
“flexible” sensory phenomenology; sensory phenomenology is not an 
essential property of supposition. This makes supposition akin to other 
attitudinal mental states such as belief and desire, which also do not appear 
to have intrinsic SP properties. When we suppose-that there is a pink star, we 
can perform this supposing with, or without the image of a pink star. But, 
when we imagine-that there is a pink star, we must do this with an image of 
some kind, otherwise we are not imagining, but rather, we are supposing. 
 
 The fact that supposition can take-or-leave its SP content, whereas 
imagination, by contrast, cannot, leads to a few striking differences in the way 
that imagination and supposition behave. This behaviour is mainly wrapped 
up in the restrictive role that the essential SP property has on imagination, but 
does not have on supposition. SP restricts the content of what can be 
imagined, in a way that it does not restrict the content of what can be 
supposed. There could of course be many ways that SP exerts a restriction 
on imagination in a way that it does not restrict supposition. I can think of 
three. Imagination is bound by SP in a way that supposition is not bound, by: 
(i) phenomenal experiences we have previously had (Jackson, 2016), (ii) 
metaphysical and logical limitations, and (iii) imaginative resistance. 
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Imagination is bound by our phenomenal experiences, because if we 
have not had a phenomenal experience similar to what we are to imagine, we 
are unable to properly replicate those experiences in an imagining (Jackson, 
2016). Without prior phenomenological experience, the best we are able to do 
is suppose that the given state of affairs under consideration pertains. In order 
to illustrate this point, Jackson outlines a scenario where a person would find 
it difficult to imagine, with phenomenal accuracy, what it is like to have an IV 
needle in their arm. She argues that unless one had previous experience of 
what it is to have an IV needle in their arm, a person is unlikely to accurately 
represent the phenomenal feel of the situation. On the other hand, without the 
requisite previous experience, they could, by contrast, accurately suppose the 
situation of having an IV needle in their arm.  
 
Arguably, if one cannot imagine such a state of affairs, one might be 
inclined to suppose it instead. Or suppose it, but claim that one is imagining it. 
Contrariwise, because a person might have previously had the experience of 
having an IV needle in their arm, they might be inclined to imagine with SP, 
that such a state of affairs obtains even though they might have been asked 
to just suppose it. Since we can suppose with SP, supposition can often be 
confused with imagination. However, since we cannot imagine without SP, we 
cannot easily confuse imagination with supposition. The fact that these mental 
states can often be muddled to us, both conceptually and in practice, 
demonstrates how very alike they are. No wonder, if the only fundamental 
difference between them is the role that phenomenology plays in determining 
what type of mental state they are.  
 
 Imagine-that you are giving birth. This is a prime example of 
imagination needing previous phenomenal experience in order to authentically 
imagine that such a state of affairs obtains. Women complain incessantly that 
men do not know what the pain of childbirth is like. Children ask inquisitively 
what it is like to give birth. Mothers do their best to explain the sensation, but 
know that it is something that cannot be explained. It has to be experienced. 
Without the previous phenomenal experience of childbirth, one cannot 
faithfully reproduce the appropriate SP for such a scenario, and therefore 
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cannot imagine, with appropriate SP, giving birth to a child. One can suppose 
it however. One can suppose that it is painful, arduous, degrading, 
empowering, and so on. One can suppose that such a state of affairs obtains 
with some associative imagery even. But a person cannot truly imagine what 
it is to give birth if they cannot recreate past phenomenal experiences when 
imagining this state of affairs. 
 
 Distinguishing SP from supposition also allows us to suppose things 
that we find metaphysically impossible to imagine. Take for example a round 
square. We can suppose that there is such a thing as a round square, but we 
cannot imagine it. Since we have never experienced a round square because 
it is metaphysically impossible, we are unable to reproduce the image of it in 
our mind’s eye. If we cannot bring this image to mind, we cannot imagine a 
round square. We can, however, suppose it; we can suppose-that there is a 
round square. This proposition can be supposed because it is possible to 
suppose logical contradictions, since that is how proofs by contradiction work. 
We can suppose in this way because SP is not an intrinsic property of 
supposition in the same way it is for imagination, and SP does not therefore 
fix the content of supposition in the same way it does for imagination. 
 
 Obviously, there are instances where we can authentically imagine 
content even though we have not had a previous phenomenal experience of 
what we are imagining. We can imagine Pegasus. We can imagine Pegasus 
because we have had prior experience of the image of a horse and an image 
of wings. We can therefore put these two images together in our mind’s eye in 
order to authentically imagine-that there is a flying horse. One who has never 
experienced a horse or wings however, is going to struggle to imagine 
Pegasus. In such an instance, they would have to just suppose the state of 
affairs, maybe with some kind of inauthentic imagery, preferably after being 
given a description of some kind relating what a Pegasus even is. 
 
 A third argument to support a case for imagination needing SP in order 
for it to be an imagining is the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. There 
are many forms of imaginative resistance. One such form is an inability to 
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imagine situations which strongly disagree with our most firmly held moral 
beliefs. Embedded in these beliefs are phenomenal feelings of rightness and 
wrongness. In these cases, one might balk at, or indeed “resist” an imagining 
when it involves a situation or scenario that deliberately affronts the SP aspect 
of these firmly held beliefs. Take for example a request to imagine-that the 
sexual harassment of an under-aged girl by her teacher is not just morally 
acceptable, but morally incumbent on the teacher to do so. An imagining such 
as this provokes feelings of disgust and repulsion within us because it directly 
affronts the SP content of our firmly held belief that this proposition is morally 
wrong. We would sooner condemn it, than imagine it. Thus, it is natural for us 
to want to resist such an imagining. Many people would understandably say, 
“no, sorry, I just can’t imagine a world where this could be the case.” 
 
 If imagination did not come with SP content however, the feelings of 
disgust and disturbance by imagining such a proposition would not be a 
problem for us, as we can observe when asked to instead, suppose the state 
of affairs obtains. Supposing-that the sexual harassment of an under-aged girl 
by her teacher is not just morally acceptable, but morally incumbent on the 
teacher to do so, does not invite us to “feel” the situation in the same 
phenomenal way that imagining the state of affairs does. We are able to 
suppose that this state of affairs obtains but not imagine it because 
supposition is able to accept the proposition in a way that imagination cannot. 
Unlike imagination, supposition is able to accept the content of a proposition 
such as the one above, because supposition can suspend all of our 
phenomenological experiences from the content that is supposed. Whereas 
imagination cannot accept it because of the restriction that our phenomenal 
experiences puts upon imagination. Therefore, without associative 
phenomenal content, supposition is able to accept content that imagination 
might resist. 
 
 In her “supposition as acceptance” argument Jackson (2016, pg.52) 
quotes Stalnaker in considering: 
“a category of propositional attitudes and methodological stances 
towards a proposition” that includes belief, but also many other mental 
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attitudes very much like belief: “To accept a proposition is to treat it as 
true for some reason. One ignores, at least temporarily and perhaps in 
a limited context the possibility that it is false.” 
 
Supposition, then, is as a type of acceptance which is analogous to other 
attitudinal mental states such as belief because it is an attitude that “takes a 
methodological stance towards a proposition.” In this case, the 
methodological approach is one of acceptance and compartmentalization.  
 
 In a similar way to our current understanding of PI, supposition is 
cognitively compartmentalised. Supposition is compartmentalised in order to 
be able to accept the proposition as true for the sake of the supposing, 
without calling into question or creating any conflict with any of our firmly held 
beliefs about the world. The nature of supposition also allows us to accept a 
proposition we do not know to be true in order to reason through its 
consequences. It is best understood as a minimal form of acceptance that 
allows us to take propositions as true for a limited time and in a limited 
context, and that enables us to reason through their implications (Jackson, 
2016, pg.53). Like so-called PI, supposition is a way of inferentially sorting 
through plausible possibilities in a reality-congruent way of what might follow if 
such-and-such were the case.  
 
 For these reasons, we should think of supposition as a cognitive 
capacity that can operate without sensory phenomenology or previous 
phenomenological experience. The way supposition compartmentalises itself 
from belief allows us to avoid some imaginative resistance conflicts. In 
addition, it also allows us to accept propositions as true for a limited amount of 
time. It is difficult at this point then, to determine how supposition is any 
different from so-called PI. Without SP content, there are no qualifying 
features that allow us to distinguish the mental attitude of supposition from the 
functionalist’s description of PI; without SP content, the PI has not conceptual 
difference from supposition. Furthermore, without essential SP content, we 
are unable to resolve any conceptual distinction – both functionally and 
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consciously – that one might have of the two mental states. There is nothing 
to tell the attitudes apart from one another.  
 
 Thus, SP has to be an essential and intrinsic property of PI. 
Imagination must have SP content. Without SP content, a so-called imagining 
simply is not an act of imagination. Imagination that appears to be qualia-free 
is actually supposition. Supposition is an attitudinal mental state that behaves 
just like imagination, but, unlike imagination it does not have to have imagery 
in order to make it the type of mental state it is. Since, by applying 
introspection, we can determine that SP is an essential property of 
imagination, SP must do some work in fixing PI content – at least insofar as it 
distinguishes imagination as the type of mental state it is.  
 
 
Section Five – Content Outruns Imagery  
 
In order to simplify what is being analysed, it is useful to consider one 
thought or one mental state at a time. Then, from that analysis, we can 
determine what essential elements are needed in order to make the thought, 
the thought it is. This way of analysing thoughts appears to work quite well for 
attitudinal mental states such as belief or desire. We can quite easily desire 
one state of affairs at a time, and we can easily do the same with belief. We 
can believe that the world is round, that catching Pokémon is a waste of time, 
that it is better to be a glass half-full kind of person, and so on. In theory, this 
way of analysing imagination should also work well. We should be able to 
analyse PI as one state of affairs at a time, and our analysis should be able to 
do much the same work, and glean much the same results as when we 
analyse other mental states, one state at a time.  
 
 Unlike belief, desire and many other attitudinal mental states however, 
we clearly have extended episodes of imagining where many states of affairs 
are tightly interlocked in a continuous chain of thoughts. Even if it were the 
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case that we could theoretically conceive of a particular imagined state of 
affairs without SP content, it does not mean to say that, taken as a whole, the 
act of imagination does not have SP content. This is to say, that we cannot 
have an imaginative episode without any imagery whatsoever. Functionalists 
have of course made allowance, with their PWB, for this sort of particular 
behaviour. Inferentially sorting through extended chains of imagined states of 
affairs is one of the specific jobs of the PWB. If we recall, the behaviour of the 
PWB is somewhat different from the behaviour of the belief box or the desire 
box. While the desire and belief boxes contain – long-term – all of our 
clustered and singular belief and desire tokens, the purpose of the PWB is to 
hold representational tokens that are related and relevant to one another just 
for the duration of the episode of imagining. This is why, in practice, when we 
imagine-that a particular state of affairs obtains, we do not usually imagine 
one state of affairs on its own and in isolation. We usually imagine an 
extended scenario of some kind; that a whole chain of interrelated imagined 
states of affairs obtains.  
 
 The interesting thing about the architectural model of the imagination is 
that although we have a theoretical description of how the whole thing is 
supposed to work, we do not have a description of how the whole thing 
actually does work. Theoretically many representational tokens should be 
active and segregated within the PWB at a time. We are also informed that 
theoretically, a single state of imagined affairs does not have SP as an 
essential property, and that therefore NO states of imagined affairs 
necessarily have SP as an essential property. We are then provided with an 
inferred conclusion that an entire episode of imagining can take place within 
the PWB without any SP properties whatsoever – no imagery is needed. 
 
 Of course, if we were just considering one belief, or one desire token, a 
conclusion such as this might, for some, be acceptable. But we are not. 
Imagination is not like belief or desire. It is very rare to imagine just one state 
of affairs on its own. The way we usually imagine, is by entertaining several 
states of affairs in succession. The fact that we imagine in this way, is another 
way that imagination is different from other attitudinal mental states. It is a 
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difference which is distinctive, and therefore, this difference should not go 
overlooked.   
  
 Let us consider, for argument’s sake, that you were able to rise to my 
challenge in section three and do some imagining without any SP. You were 
able to imagine-that London Bridge is made of Candyfloss without any 
associative imagery. Perhaps I have not convinced you that, if you are able to 
do such an “imagining”, what you are really doing is supposing. In this case, I 
am going to challenge you to imagine a series of states in the form of a short 
scenario. But, you must imagine the scenario without any associative imagery 
whatsoever. No one can read a work of fiction or hear a story without 
entertaining some sort of imagery. It is impossible. As soon as some 
phenomenal description is involved in the imagined scenario, SP does the 
work of recreating our phenomenal experiences with images. These images 
are always related in some way to the propositional content of the imagining, 
and to an extent, the images fix the content of what it is that we are imagining. 
Here is a little story to elucidate my point: 
 
Imagine-that –  
There are hundreds of dead whales. All of them massacred, probably 
due to the pollution in the sea. Imagine-that they completely cover the 
hot sandy bed. Their pink skins and silver fins flash in the light of the 
sun. Imagine-that you are stroking the back of the whale nearest to 
you. It lifts its head. Starts talking in German and then jumps back into 
the sea. It is laughing at you, because pink whales with silver fins that 
speak fluent German do not actually exist and so you should not have 
felt so sad that you thought they were all dead… 
 
 You might have had a very full phenomenal experience during this 
episode of imagining. You might have only had flashes of imagery. But you 
did have imagery of some kind. What this proves it that, even if it is possible 
to imagine-that a particular imagery-free state of affairs obtains, we cannot 
have an extended episode of imagining without any associative imagery 
whatsoever.  
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What this also shows is that when we imagine a series of states of 
affairs in succession, the SP content of the episode as a whole, can be 
sporadic. What I mean by sporadic, is that not each and every state of affairs 
necessarily has to have strong and distinctive imagery. Our imaginings, taken 
as a whole, do not run like a neat little movie, filled with rich and detailed 
pictures and sounds that fill the entire inward “movie screen” of our 
introspected conscious thoughts. The imagery that comes with an extended 
episode of imagining, tends to focus on specific details rather than the picture 
as a whole. We zoom in, we zoom out, we freeze frame. We hear fragments 
of sound, smell wafts of scents and taste the sea air (even if we do not “see” 
it). Sometimes the imagery is sparse in an imaginative episode, and 
sometimes an imaginative episode is experientially packed with SP content. 
Some states of affairs might be very rich in imagery whereas some states of 
affairs less so. SP is not always in complete alignment with the propositional 
content of what is being imagined. We know that when we engage in a 
sustained episode of imagining we might not have a fine grained detailed 
picture of what we are imagining. The accompanying imagery might be 
sketchy, or disjointed. We might get only snippets of imagery – snippets that 
amount to disproportionately less than the propositional content of the 
imagining. It might appear that an imaginative episode is richer in content than 
it is in imagery, giving the appearance that the content of imaginative 
episodes “outruns” the imagery of imaginative episodes.   
 
 One of the reasons that content outruns imagery in an episode of 
imagining is that when we imagine a series of states, we often use the same 
image for more than one state of affairs. This might seem like a sort of freeze-
framed effect. Perhaps whilst I merrily described the stroking of the whale’s 
back, you still had the image of the whale’s silver fin to mind, and by doing so, 
you were using the same image for more than one propositional content. Of 
course, this example is for sampling purposes only. Think of any instance of 
prolonged imagining, and a similar effect can, and often will apply. We often 
have imaginings whilst perhaps reading a work of fiction, where an image will 
 35 
remain the same, even though the propositional content has changed or the 
narrative has developed. 
 
 Furthermore, it is not just the image that can remain the same for 
different propositional content. We are often able to imagine the same 
propositional content, time-after-time, but with different associative imagery. 
The image of a black hairy dog that accompanies the proposition, imagine-
that there is a black hairy dog, might be a Doberman today, and a Scottie dog 
tomorrow – depending on our predilections at the time. Perhaps if you were to 
imagine the same whale scenario again, you might have a different image for 
the same propositional content. When you stroke the whale’s back, you stroke 
it with your right hand instead of your left hand this time. Since we are able to 
use the same imagery for different propositional content, and, have many 
different images for the same propositional content, Amy Kind (2001), claims 
that although imagery is an essential property of imagination, SP cannot be 
doing the work of fixing the content of what is imagined. 
 
 
Section Six – SP Does Some Content Fixing 
 
“Imagery can be thought of as the paint of the imagination.” (2001, pg.108) 
 
Writes Amy Kind in Putting the Image Back in Imagination. What this 
metaphor sets out to claim, is that just as we cannot paint a picture without 
paint, we cannot imagine without imagery. It is an apt metaphor to use, 
because the comparison of imagining and painting also entails a second 
feature of both the act of imagining and painting: just as the object of what we 
paint is not the paint, the object of what we imagine is not the image. By 
deploying this metaphor, Kind intends to illustrate an important distinction 
between two claims. The first is an essentialist claim: that imagination has to 
have imagery in order to make it the type of mental state it is. The second is 
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an individuative claim: that imagery is individuative of imaginings; imagery 
makes a given imagining the thought that it is.  
  
 She argues that since, when imagining we can use different imagery 
for the same propositional content, and the same imagery for different 
propositional content, imagery cannot be a factor in what individuates a given 
imagining – and by extension fixes the content of an imagining. But, she 
claims, just because imagery does not individuate imaginings, this does not 
entail that imagery is not an essential property of imagination. Imagination 
must still have some form of imagery in order to make it the type of mental 
state it is. Thus, she concludes one can viably hold the position that, whilst 
imagery is essential to imagination, imagery does not have to be individuative 
of imaginings.  
 
 She makes two main arguments to support her claim that imagery does 
not individuate imaginings. The first of these is an argument that postulates 
something similar to the argument I have outlined in section five. Since 
imaginings are not accompanied with specific images that are particular to the 
imagined content, the image must therefore not have a direct relevancy to 
what is imagined. Kind’s second argument is called the object claim. She 
writes that it is very easy to confuse the essential accompaniment of imagery 
in imagination, with what is being imagined. She points out that because 
imagery accompanies imaginings, we can often assume that what is being 
imagined is the accompanying image.  
 
This, of course is not the case. What is being imagined is what the 
token represents and, what the accompanying image depicts. So, we might 
imagine a particular state of affairs such as Donald Trump skydiving and this 
imagining is accompanied by an image of Donald Trump being shoved from a 
plane. We are not imagining the image of Donald, but rather, we are 
imagining the state of affairs at hand – we imagine Donald skydiving. The 
image does some work in representing the object, but it is not the object. The 
same rule applies when we imagine Sherlock Holmes. Kind (2001, pg.106) 
points out that if the image is the object that is being imagined, then it would 
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not be possible for us to imagine Sherlock Holmes, since he is a fictional 
entity. 
 
 She concludes that, although images do not do any work in 
individuating and fixing the content of what is being imagined, images are an 
essential property of imagination. Images at least do some work in 
distinguishing imagination as the type of mental state it is. Sensory 
phenomenology is therefore essential in making an act of imagination, an act 
of imagination, but, according to Kind, it does not do any work in fixing the 
content of what is imagined. It is on this last point that Kind and I part 
company. Whilst I think that she has successfully proven that SP does not, by 
itself fix the content of imaginings, I do not think that they do no work at all in 
fixing the content of what is imagined.  
 
 Aside from the restrictive role that imagery seems to play in what can 
be imagined, there is at least one other role that imagery plays in fixing the 
content of an imagining. It is this: there are limitations of the range of images 
that we are able to use to accompany a given propositional content of an 
imagining. Kind Says as much herself. She writes: 
 
Not just any image will do, of course, for it has to be an image of him 
[Clinton], and moreover an image of him in the act of giving a campaign 
speech, but it does not matter whether the image I produce has him 
dressed in a hard-hat or tuxedo’ (2001, pg.102). 
 
This quotation implies two things – things that Kind probably did not 
intend. One, is that accompanying images have to be relevant to the 
propositional content of what is being imagined, and so therefore the image 
plays some role in fixing the content of an imagining. The other, is to do with 
the influential role that imagery has in relation to the propositional content of 
what is being imagined. The fact that the image has to be relevant to the 
content of what is imagined, indicates that images must play some sort of role 
in fixing the content of an imagining. If images did no work in fixing the content 
of imaginings, there would be no problem in having any old imagery to 
 38 
accompany imaginings. If we accept, as Kind argues, that images are 
essential to imagination, but do not do work in fixing the content of what is 
imagined, in theory, we should be able to have any old imagery with our 
imaginings. So long as an imagining has imagery, it should not matter if that 
imagery has any relevancy to the propositional content of the imagining. We 
should be able to imagine Donald Trump skydiving, with an accompanying 
image of pink whales with silver fins. Or that Pokémon invade planet Earth 
with an accompanying image of London Bridge made of candy floss. But, we 
can do neither. All of our imaginings come with accompanying imagery that 
has some sort of relationship to the propositional content of what is being 
imagined. Since we always imagine with accompanying imagery that is 
related to the content of what is being imagined, the accompanying imagery of 
a given imagining must be doing some work in fixing the content of what is 
imagined.  
 
The relationship that imagery has with the propositional content of an 
imagining does not stop at just being relevant. The fact that imagery has this 
relevant relationship with the propositional content of an imagined state of 
affairs indicates something more. It indicates that Kind is wrong to think that 
she can imagine the propositional content that-Clinton is giving a campaign 
speech with different imagery. There is an either/or aspect to her imagining. If 
Kind imagines-that Clinton is giving a campaign speech with the image of a 
hard-hat, she is imagining a different state of affairs from Clinton giving a 
campaign speech. If Kind imagines-that Clinton is giving a campaign speech 
whilst wearing a tuxedo, again, she is imagining a different state of affairs 
from either Clinton giving a campaign speech, or Clinton giving a campaign 
speech wearing a hard-hat. The image that accompanies the imagining 
appears to influence the propositional content of what is being imagined. If, 
when I asked you to imagine stroking a whale’s back, you did this with an 
image of your right hand, then what you imagined was not the specific state of 
affairs I asked you to imagine. Rather, you imagined a state of affairs where 
you stroked the whale’s back with your right hand. If the image that Kind, I, or 
anyone else uses in a given imagining changes or differs from the original 
propositional content, the given state of affairs changes also. The imaginer is 
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thinking a different thought. Therefore, both the image and the propositional 
content of a given imagining appear to jointly, through their relevant 
relationship, do some work in fixing the content of a given imagining. 
 
There are instances however, where we are able to use the same 
imagery with different propositional content. And this is why SP cannot be 
doing all the content fixing of imaginings. If I were to ask you to imagine-that 
there is a dead dog, or imagine-that there is a sleeping dog, you might have 
the same image for either propositional content. We can imagine-that a glass 
is half full, and imagine-that a glass is half empty with the same image, yet, 
the propositional content of the imagining is different. The fact that we are 
able to do this indicates that the extent to which the image has an effect on 
the propositional content of an imagining has to be limited to some extent. 
Imagery is not doing all the content fixing of what is imagined, only some. 
 
So, let us then return to the original functionalist position where we are 
to think of an imagining with a “proposition first” approach. If we persist with 
this approach, there is no problem with Kind’s claim that we can have different 
imagery with the same propositional content. And, if we hold this position, we 
have still gained some ground. The image relevancy issue has still not been 
satisfied. There is still a restriction on the range of images that are able to 
accompany the propositional content of an imagining, so the image must be 
doing some of the work in fixing the content of what is imagined, and we can 
therefore claim as much. We can also claim that SP is most definitely an 
essential property of imagination – it’s what makes an imagining an imagining 
rather than some other kind of attitudinal mental state. But, we still have a 
problem. Due to the tendency of imagery to act more like an accompanying 
property of the representational token of a given imagining, as we have seen 
in our “content outruns imagery” argument, and Kind’s “same image for 
different propositional content” argument, it is difficult to claim that SP is doing 
all the fixing of a given imagining. It does not individuate specific imaginings 
as the imaginings they are (mark them or single them out).  
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Since our imaginings are conscious because we are able to introspect 
their phenomenal properties, phenomenology must be doing the work of fixing 
the content of a given imagining. Since SP is not doing all of the work – only 
some of the work, we have an explanatory gap problem. But, we only have 
this problem if SP is the only phenomenology there is. However, recent 
discussions have popularised the idea of a new type of phenomenology. 
Namely cognitive phenomenology [CP]. There are varying views as to the full 
extent of what role CP plays in conscious thoughts, and by extension 
imaginings. My view is this: CP is both individuative and proprietary to 
conscious thoughts, and by extension PI, and, by virtue of this, it also plays a 
role in fixing the content of conscious thoughts and imaginings – a role that 
SP does not play.  
 
 
Section Seven – Cognitive Phenomenology  
 
Imagine-that it is getting dark… 
 
Now, 
Imagine-that after his brief trial he was stoned… 
 
What about something already used as an example: 
Imagine-that there is a hot sandy bed… 
 
 How were you able to identify and understand the propositional content 
that these sentences express? Moreover, these sentences each express 
more than one proposition. How were you able to distinguish between the 
different propositional content that these sentences express? One can either 
understand imagine-that it is getting dark to express that there is a removal of 
light, or one can understand the same sentence as expressing that something 
sinister is happening. Similarly, one can understand the sentence of imagine-
that after his brief trial he was stoned as expressing the proposition that either 
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stones were thrown at some poor guy, or some more fortunate guy enjoyed 
himself a reefer high. How were you able to distinguish imagining-that there is 
a hot sandy bed from our story in section five, as expressing a beach of hot 
sand, rather than a bed covered in hot sand? The short answer is: cognitive 
phenomenology does the job of distinguishing one thought from another. 
 
CP is often contrasted with SP and is thought to be a type of 
phenomenology that is over and above SP. CP is not to be thought of as 
reducible to SP; as mere sensation or feeling. Rather, CP allows us to know 
‘what it is like’ to think that p. David Pitt (2004, pg.45-46) writes: 
 
I would not characterize cognitive phenomenology as a feeling. That 
would be (in my view) to class it with such experiences as tactile 
sensations, proprioceptions and emotions. But I do not think it is any of 
these. It is a kind of awareness closer, in fact, to visual or auditory 
experiences – which, I take it, are not literally felt. Yet it is unique; it is 
not like any other kind of phenomenology.  
 
What can be gleaned from Pitt’s description is that CP is not to be thought of 
as reducible to SP. CP is a very different kind of phenomenology. CP allow us 
to cognitively experience, and be aware, through introspection our conscious 
thoughts and what our conscious thoughts contain. It does this in a way that 
SP cannot. Pitt states that CP is not a feeling, whereas SP is. There are some 
who would argue however, that CP is a type of feeling – it is a type of 
cognitive feeling. Whether you agree or disagree with Pitt that cognitive 
experiences can be experienced as a feeling or not, makes no odds here. 
Either view accepts that CP allows us to access and experience our occurrent 
conscious thoughts in a way that SP cannot. Where SP allows us to 
consciously access our sensory experiences, CP allows us to access our 
cognitive experiences.  
 
There are many arguments that provide evidence for the need of a type 
of phenomenology that is over and above SP. These arguments often focus 
on the particular role that CP plays in fixing the content of conscious thoughts 
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– a role that SP does not play. Contrast arguments, such as the one above, 
are one of the most popular ways of demonstrating that CP is not only present 
in thoughts, but what role CP plays in thoughts. Contrast arguments seek to 
respond to the question of what it is to cognitively experience our thoughts 
when we introspectively attend to them – particularly if we cannot reduce the 
experience to a sensory feeling of some kind. What the experience of CP 
comes down to is a type of cognitive experience; an experience of 
understanding the content of our conscious thoughts.  
 
In order to make sure that the understanding of our conscious thoughts 
is due to CP, rather than SP, philosophical thought experiments that advocate 
CP seek to neutralise the role that SP plays in order to highlight the role that 
CP plays in our ability to understand our conscious thoughts. According to 
Michelle Montague (2017, pg.305): 
 
Phenomenological contrast arguments involve the presentation 
of two scenarios that allegedly differ in overall phenomenological 
character but not in sensory-phenomenological features. The idea is 
simple: because, by hypothesis, there is no difference in sensory 
phenomenology, the phenomenological contrast between them must 
be nonsensory, and is best accounted for by some form of nonsensory 
CP. 
 
Some contrast arguments appeal to the best explanation of the difference 
between sentences that we do understand and sentences that we do not 
understand. For example, a case might be presented where a sentence is in 
one’s native tongue is contrasted with a sentence that expresses the same 
proposition in an unfamiliar language. Such as the writer of this thesis is 
slightly crazy contrasted with awdur y traethawd hwn yn wallgof ychydig. 
Where for an English speaker an experience of understanding takes place 
when presented with the first sentence, no experience of understanding takes 
place when presented with the second sentence (unless the person also 
speaks Welsh). This then indicates that CP must be present in the thought 
that we understand because understanding is a conscious experience only if 
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we can introspect the CP properties of the conscious thought (Strawson, 
1994). 
 
 Other contrast arguments, such as the one used at the beginning of 
this section, include proposing instances where we can not only understand 
more than one meaning of the same sentence, but we can identify which is 
the meaning that we are to grasp from the sentence. Arguments such as 
these present propositions in the speaker’s language that could be 
understood to have more than one interpretation. CP is thought to be 
essential in being able to grasp the right content of sentences such as these; 
sentences that use the same verbal imagery, but differ in propositional 
content (Horgan and Tienson, 2002). Other cases involve seeing and 
recognising two different images in the same picture, such as the infamous 
rabbit and duck sketch or the young-lady, old-lady drawing. Another way of 
illustrating the “double seeing effect” might be, two people who hear the same 
sound, but have different experiences of that sound; they understand them in 
different ways. Take for example a fire-alarm. If one has had first-hand 
experience of fire-alarms and their purpose, one will act accordingly upon 
hearing a fire-alarm. If one has no knowledge or experience of the meaning of 
a fire-alarm, the sound is likely to be baffling. 
 
 Contrast cases demonstrate that there is not only a difference in the 
role that SP and CP play in conscious thoughts, but contrast arguments also 
serve to outline the specific role that CP plays in our conscious thoughts. The 
specific role that CP plays in conscious thoughts is that, through applying 
introspection, we are able to identify a given thought as the thought it is and 
what it contains. In order for CP to do this, each and every occurrent 
conscious thought has to have CP properties. This includes PIs. In this 
respect, CP is proprietary to all conscious thoughts – all conscious thoughts 
have distinctive CP properties. And, CP is individuative of all conscious 
thoughts – because of the distinct CP of each thought, we are able to 
distinguish, identify and instantly understand the thought as the thought it is. 
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Without CP and the proprietary and individuative role it plays in fixing 
the content of conscious thought, any account of conscious thought – or 
imagination for that matter – will fail, ‘to distinguish between knowing that one 
knows something and knowing what one knows’ (Pitt, 2004, pg.25). What Pitt 
means by this statement is that, not only does CP allow us to know, and 
therefore identify what type of mental state we are experiencing, but, it also 
allows us to know and therefore identify the particular thought we are having. 
In summary, CP allows thoughts that seemingly have no SP properties to be 
conscious thoughts, because we are able to introspectively understand them. 
In addition, CP does the work that SP cannot do in fixing the content of 
thoughts that have essential SP properties, such as an imagining.  
 
Thus, when we introspect the phenomenal properties of our 
imaginings, we find that we are able to distinguish our imaginings as 
imaginings, not just from an imagining’s SP properties, but also from an 
imagining’s CP properties. Where SP marks an imagining as the type of 
attitudinal mental state it is, and does some work in fixing the content of what 
is imagined, CP fixes our cognitive understanding of the content of an 
imagining. So, when we imagine-that there is a dead dog, or imagine-that 
there is a sleeping dog, we are able to understand the difference in the 
propositional content of these thoughts. SP cannot help us to understand the 
propositional difference, since we might experience exactly the same imagery 
in both instances. In a similar vein, when we imagine-that there is a glass half 
full, or imagine-that there is a glass half empty, the distinct CP properties that 
both thoughts have, allow us to distinguish the propositional content of these 
thoughts from one another – even though both thoughts may have the same 
SP properties, or imagery. Moreover, we are able to understand the 
propositional content of the thoughts and what the propositional content of the 
thoughts entails. Without the CP properties of these thoughts, there is nothing 
to explain how it is that we are able to consciously understand the 
propositional and imagistic content of what the thoughts contain, or, what the 
difference between the thoughts is.  
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Therefore, the fact that all thoughts have a distinct proprietary CP that 
individuates them as the thought they are, allows us to introspectively 
differentiate between imagining-that Pokémon invade planet Earth and 
imagining-that T-Rex’s can pole dance. It also allows us to introspectively 
discern, when imagining-that Pokémon invade planet Earth, in what sense the 
imagining is meant. Are we to take this imagining in a literal sense and 
imagine little spaceships with Pokémon on board descending to planet Earth? 
Or, are we to imagine-that we are playing an interactive game on our phones? 
The ability to individuate thoughts in this way, enables us to know what our 
thoughts are about; CP provides thoughts with a particular intentional content 
(Montague, 2017, pg.306-307).  
 
To recap, it would seem that there are certain attitudinal mental states, 
that, when applied to given propositional content (such as believing-that 
seventeen is a prime number), do not have SP as an essential property. If SP 
is the only type of phenomenology there is, it would follow that a theoretical 
framework giving a full account of these attitudinal mental states could be 
established without phenomenology. However, we would have to accept that 
these thoughts are not conscious thoughts, since we cannot introspect their 
phenomenal properties if they have no phenomenal properties. Once one 
acknowledges that there is another type of phenomenology other than SP, 
namely CP, and CP is an essential proprietary and individuative property of all 
conscious thoughts, it is not theoretically conceivable to remove all 
phenomenology from attitudinal mental states. We can introspectively attend 
to our conscious thoughts and cognitively experience the content of our 
conscious thoughts. Therefore, conscious thoughts must at least have CP in 
order to fix the content of thoughts. Without CP, a thought cannot be 
cognitively understood as the thought it is and we cannot immediately 
distinguish thoughts one from another, and identify the thought as the thought 
it is.  
 
Since CP is an essential property that fixes the content of all conscious 
thoughts, CP is also an essential, proprietary and individuative property of all 
propositional imaginings. Accordingly, CP does some significant work in fixing 
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the content of propositional imagination. In cooperation with SP, CP plays a 
particular role in imaginings, by enabling us to determine that we are 
imagining, and what we are imagining. Because it doesn’t allow for CP, the 
functionalist model falls short of a full explanation of what the imagination is, 
how it works, and what its basic essential properties are. 
 
 
Wrapping Up & Recap 
 
 When we consciously experience our imaginings, it is because we are 
able to acquaint ourselves directly with their phenomenal content by 
introspectively attending to them. Through applying introspection, we are able 
to determine that imagination – propositional or otherwise – has both cognitive 
and sensory phenomenology. SP distinguishes an act of imagination, as an 
act of imagination, rather than some other mental state. And, as such, an act 
of imagination cannot be an act of imagination without SP. It is therefore an 
essential property of the mental attitude of imagination. SP also has an 
important role in fixing the content of a given imagining, at least insofar as it 
restricts the imaginer in relation to what can be imagined; so SP content has 
to have some relevancy to the propositional content of what is imagined. 
Furthermore, the relationship that SP has with the propositional content of an 
imagining means that, if the SP changes, it also influences a change in the 
propositional content of what is being imagined. The full extent of the role SP 
plays in fixing the content of PI is still yet to be determined. There could still 
be many ways that SP plays a role in fixing the content of imaginings – ways 
that are yet unidentified in this paper. Whatever the case, it is clear that SP 
does at least some of the work in fixing the content of imagination. 
 
 Yet SP is not doing all the phenomenal content fixing of imagination, 
because there are at least two ways that SP has a limitation when it comes to 
fixing the content of imaginings. Firstly, we are able to use the same imagery 
for different propositional content. And secondly, when we imagine several 
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states of affairs consecutively, the content of an episode of imagining seems 
to outweigh its associative SP, indicating that “content outruns imagery.” We 
can therefore claim, that although the act of imagination must have SP, SP is 
not individuative of each imagining, and cannot then, be doing all the work in 
fixing the content of each imagined state of affairs.  
 
 Since we can apply introspection to determine that SP is present in the 
content of our PIs, we can also apply introspection to determine that CP is 
present in our PIs. The specific role that CP plays, provides us with a 
cognitive experience of our conscious thoughts. In the case of PI, the 
experience that CP provides us with is what it is to imagine-that such-and-
such is the case. CP is both proprietary and individuative to imaginative 
thoughts and by virtue of this, CP also does some content fixing of 
imaginings. It allows us to identify, understand and differentiate imaginings as 
the distinct imaginings they are.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 It is clear that so-called propositional imagination must have both SP 
and CP properties in order to make it an act of imagination. SP and CP 
properties jointly fix the content of what is imagined, and, in combination they 
allow us to introspectively experience our imaginings, both sensationally and 
cognitively. By demonstrating that propositional imagination has 
phenomenology, and moreover, that the phenomenology plays an essential 
role in fixing the content of propositional imagination, the SI/PI distinction 
collapses and the conception of a type of qualia-free imagination is debunked. 
This creates an ongoing problem for functionalists and those who support the 
notion that imagination – propositional or otherwise, can be conceptualised 
without phenomenology. 
 
 48 
Bibliography  
 
Balcerak, J, M. (2016). ‘Imagining, Supposing, and Conceiving’. In: A. Kind 
(Ed.), Knowledge Through Imagination. New York: OUP. pg.41-60. 
Bayne, T & Montague, M. (2011). ‘Cognitive Phenomenology: An 
Introduction’. In: Bayne, T. and Montague, M. Cognitive 
Phenomenology. London: Oxford University Press. pg.1-31. 
Byrne, R. (2005). The Rational Imagination. Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Currie, G & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). ‘Introduction’. In: Currie, G & Ravenscroft, I 
Recreative Minds. New York: Oxford University Press. pg.1-4. 
Currie, G & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). ‘Projections and Recreations’. In: Currie, G 
& Ravenscroft, I Recreative Minds. New York: Oxford University Press. 
pg.5-23. 
Debus, D. (2016). ‘Imagination and Memory’. In: Kind, A. The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.135-
148. 
Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, Imagination, & Philosophical Methodology. 
Oxford: OUP. 
Gregory, D. (2016). ‘Imagination and Mental Imagery’: In: A, Kind (Ed.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination: Routledge. pg.97-
110. 
Horgan, T. & Tienson, J. (2002). ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and 
the Phenomenology of Intentionality’. In: D.J. Chalmers (Ed.), 
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: 
University Press. pg.520-532. 
Ichikawa, J. (2016). ‘Imagination, Dreaming, and Hallucination’. In: A, Kind 
(Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: 
Routledge. pg.149-162. 
Kind, A. (2001). Putting the Image Back in Imagination. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. 62 (1), pg.85-109. 
Kind, A. (2013). ‘The Heterogeneity of the Imagination’. Erkenntnis. 78 (1), 
pg.141-159. 
Kind, A. (2016). ‘Desire-Like Imagination’: In: A, Kind (Ed.), The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.163-
176. 
Kind, A. (2016). ‘Introduction’. In: Kind, A. The Routledge Handbook of 
Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.1-11. 
Kind, A. & Kung, P. (2016). Knowledge Through Imagination. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kind, A. & Kung, P. (2016). ‘Introduction. The Puzzle of Imaginative Use’. In: 
A. Kind & P. Kung (Ed.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: 
OUP. pg.1-37. 
Langland-Hassan, P. (2016). ‘On Choosing What to Imagine’. In: A. Kind & P. 
Kung (Ed.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: OUP. pg.61-84. 
Langland-Hassan, P. (2012). ‘Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single 
Attitude Theory’. Philosophical Studies. 159 (1), pg.155-179. 
Langland-Hassan, P. (2015). ‘Self-Knowledge and Imagination’. Philosophical 
Explorations. 18 (2), pg.226-245. 
Langland-Hassan. (2015). ‘Imaginative Attitudes’. Philosophy and 
 49 
Phenomenological Research. 90 (3), pg.664-686. 
Liao, S & Doggett, T. (2014). ‘The Imagination Box’. The Journal of 
Philosophy. 111 (5), pg.259-275. 
Miyazono, K. & Shen-Li, L. (2016). ‘The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative 
Resistance’: In: A, Kind (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy 
of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.233-246. 
Montague, M. (2017). ‘Cognitive Phenomenology’. In: B. McLaughlin (Ed.), 
Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy of Mind. New York: 
Macmillan. pg.297-326. 
Montague, M. (2010). ‘Recent Work on Intentionality’. Analysis Reviews. 70 
(4), pg.765-782. 
Montague, M. (2015). ‘The Life of the Mind’. In: P. Coates & Coleman, S. 
(Ed.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. 
Oxford: OUP. pg.322-346.  
Nanay, B. (2016). ‘Imagination and Perception’. In: Kind, A. The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.124-
134. 
Nichols, S & Stitch, S. (2000). ‘A cognitive theory of pretense’. Cognition. 74 
(1), pg.115-147. 
Nichols, S. (2006). Introduction. In: Nichols, S. The Architecture of the 
Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. pg.1-16. 
Nichols, S. (2006). ‘Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like 
Believing’. Mind & Language. 21 (4), pg.459-474. 
Pitt, D. (2004). ‘The Phenomenology of Cognition or What it is Like to Think 
That P?’: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 69 (1), pg.1-36. 
Schellenberg, S. (2013). ‘Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion’. 
Journal of Philosophy. 110 (9), pg.497-517. 
Schroeder, T. & Matheson, C. (2006). ‘Imagination and Emotion’. In: Nichols, 
S. The Architecture of the Imagination. New York: OUP. pg.19-39. 
Sinhababu, N. (2016). ‘Imagination and Belief’. In: Kind, A. The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. pg.111-
123. 
Strawson, G. (1994). ‘Introduction’: Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. pg.1-18 
Strawson, G. (2005). ‘Real Intentionality v.2: Why Intentionality Entails 
Consciousness?’. Synthesis Philosophica. 40 (2), pg.279-297. 
Walton, K. (1990). ‘Introduction’: Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the 
Foundations of Representational Arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
